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Abstract. We introduce a form of steganography in the domain of ma-
chine learning which we call training set camouflage. Imagine Alice has a
training set on an illicit machine learning classification task. Alice wants
Bob (a machine learning system) to learn the task. However, sending
either the training set or the trained model to Bob can raise suspicion if
the communication is monitored. Training set camouflage allows Alice to
compute a second training set on a completely different – and seemingly
benign – classification task. By construction, sending the second train-
ing set will not raise suspicion. When Bob applies his standard (public)
learning algorithm to the second training set, he approximately recovers
the classifier on the original task. Training set camouflage is a novel form
of steganography in machine learning. We formulate training set camou-
flage as a combinatorial bilevel optimization problem and propose solvers
based on nonlinear programming and local search. Experiments on real
classification tasks demonstrate the feasibility of such camouflage.
Keywords: Machine Teaching · Adversarial Learning · Steganography
1 Introduction
Look at the classification training set shown in Figure 1a. The top row contains
instances of class positive (+), and the bottom shows instances of class negative
(-). These images can be fed into a machine learner to learn a model which
will successfully classify future, previously unseen instances (images) as + or -.
If you think that the task is fruit image classification (orange vs. apples) then
you have already been successfully fooled, in a sense to be made precise below.
The actual intended task is to classify woman vs. man, with samples shown in
Figure 1b. Indeed, a standard logistic regression learner [26] trained on only the
images in Figure 1a achieves high gender classification accuracy on the images
in Figure 1b.
In this paper, we consider an agent Alice who has a secret classification
task (e.g., classifying images of women and men) and a corresponding private
training set (women and men images). Alice wants to train a second agent, Bob,
on the secret task. However, the communication channel between them has an
eavesdropper we refer to as a third agent Eve. Eve takes the role of a data verifier,
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(a) Camouflaged training set
(b) Secret classification task
Fig. 1: Example of training set camouflage
who will terminate communication (and refuse to deliver the data to Bob) if she
is suspicious of what Alice is sending. Sending the private training set would
reveal Alice’s intention; sending the model parameters directly will also raise
suspicion. Alice must camouflage the communication for it to look mundane to
Eve, while avoiding excessive coding tricks with Bob beforehand. In the present
work, we show how Alice can construct a camouflaged training set on a cover
task which (i) does not look suspicious to Eve, and (ii) results in Bob learning
an accurate model for the secret task. In the previous example, Eve noticed that
Alice sent images of apples and oranges which seems benign, and knew nothing
of Alice’s secret task of women vs men.
Hiding information in plain sight such that its presence is not suspected is
known as steganography. Steganography is not new. In the fifth century BCE
messengers would have their heads shaved and a message written on their scalp.
Regrowing their hair served to hide the message which would only be revealed
because the intended recipient knew to shave the messenger’s head [40]. In more
modern times, steganographic techniques are used to detect unauthorized dis-
tribution of digital media [15].
Note that, steganography is different from crypotgraphy [31,61], where the
goal is to hide the data content. In cryptography, the communicating agents
have access to some particular key (pairs) which is used to encrypt and decrypt
data. Cryptography cannot be used if someone monitoring the data can alter
the data or stop the data transmission entirely. In such cases, steganography
becomes important because we do not want any intervening eavesdropper to
become suspicious and stop the data transmission.
The role and capabilities of the eavesdropper are key in selecting how to hide
information. Eve can be either passive and merely observes traffic [13], or active
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and tries to modify the hidden message [51,14]. In this manuscript we assume a
passive observer, whose only ability is to refuse to deliver Alice’s message. To our
knowledge, steganography for machine learning in this context is new. In the area
of adversarial learning [5], however, much work has been done investigating how
an agent can assert control over a learner by manipulating input data. We note
that training set camouflage differs from so called training-time or “poisoning
attacks” [36] in two primary ways: (i) Alice aims to communicate information
to Bob about a potentially completely unrelated task, not affect his behavior on
the original task and (ii) Alice specifically aims to avoid detection by Eve.
Due to the widespread use of machine learning in sensitive fields ranging from
social media to health care, the study of the security ramifications of using ML
techniques is well studied [3,47]. The work presented herein adds to this con-
versation, as we reveal an additional avenue of attack. For example, Bob might
be a model that classifies job applicants as “should hire” and “shouldn’t hire”.
The company may have many records (collected over years) of job applicants
and how they performed. It is expected from Alice to select a subset of these
records and present to Bob, with the idea that training on the complete set is too
time consuming. But Alice may be a malicious agent and wants Bob to actually
learn some additional bias (e.g., racial, gender etc.). In such a scenario, Alice
will select a subset of records that satisfies her goals while Eve’s responsibility is
to verify the data sent by Alice to Bob. Our specific contributions in this paper
are as follows: (i) We propose a general mathematical framework for defining
how Alice can achieve training set camouflage. (ii) We formulate a nonlinear-
program based approach for performing Alice’s task for a general class of learner
(Bob) and eavesdropper (Eve), and two combinatorial-search based approaches
for arbitrary learners/eavesdroppers.
2 Training Set Camouflage
In this section we describe the three agents Bob, Alice and Eve, and formulate
a camouflage optimization problem for Alice, parametrized by Bob and Eve’s
definitions.
The agent Bob uses a standard learning algorithm A : D 7→ H which, given a
training set D, learns a hypothesis A(D) in a hypothesis space H. The resulting
hypothesis maps instances in the input space X to the output space Y. This
can be multi-class classification (three or more classes) or regression, though
in the present work we focus on binary classification. We assume that Bob’s
learning algorithm is “open source”. That is, all information about A is known
to all agents. However, Bob and Alice have shared knowledge on class naming:
which class is positive and which negative. For K-class classification this shared
knowledge requires O(K logK) bits, as Alice must communicate a mapping from
K classes to K classes. For example, when Alice sends Bob orange and apple
images for the secret task of woman vs man, Alice must communicate to Bob
whether orange maps to woman and apple to man, or vice versa.
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Alice is an agent who wants to train Bob. She has a secret classification
task and the corresponding private dataset DS . In addition, she has access to
a public pool of n instances C = {(xi, yi)1:n} (the camouflage pool) drawn i.i.d.
from Q(x,y) which we call the cover data distribution. Note that this is not
the distribution from which DS is drawn. In the preceding example, Q(x,y) is
the distribution over orange and apple images, whereas DS is a collection of
photographs of women and men.
Alice seeks to select a camouflaged training set D ⊂ C which she will send to
Bob for training. Alice wants Bob to succeed on the secret task, thus she seeks
to find a D which minimizes the risk of Bob’s resulting model:
LA(D) = 1|DS |
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈DS
`(A(D)(x˜), y˜)
where `(yˆ, y) is a loss function. Note the private DS is used to define the quality
of D. Also, we note that DS and D are in different domains.
Eve is a passive eavesdropper. She observes the dataset D which Alice sends
to Bob, but does not alter it. Her goal is to determine if D is normal or suspicious.
Specifically, Eve is suspicious of any data unless it appears to be an i.i.d. sample
drawn from Q(x,y). She has access to the camouflage pool C, but like Alice
she cannot draw additional instances from Q(x,y). Eve uses C and a detection
function Ψ : D × D 7→ R+ to examine D. Here D is the domain of all possible
training sets. She flags D as suspicious if Ψ(C, D) ≥ 0. It is useful to think of Ψ
as a two-sample statistical test that aims to determine whether C, D come from
the same underlying distribution. We envision Alice as Eve’s adversary. As with
Bob, we assume that Eve is “open source”. Namely, Alice can see Eve’s detection
function Ψ .
The agents Alice and Eve have conflicting goals. Alice aims to secretly com-
municate to Bob by way of constructing a training set, while Eve is suspicious
and will flag any data sent to Bob if it looks suspect. Bob dutifully learns a
model and for our purposes has no explicit intentions. We make explicit each
Agent’s knowledge in Table 1.
Table 1: Information available to different agents
Agent Secret Set Camouflage
Pool
Bob’s
Learner
Detection
Function
Camouflaged
Training Set
DS C A Ψ D
Bob No Yes/No Yes Yes/No Yes
Alice Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eve No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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With the agents defined, we can now formulate Alice’s goal:
argmin
D⊂C
1
|DS |
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈DS
`(A(D)(x˜), y˜)
s.t. Ψ(C, D) < 0 (1)
That is, she seeks a camouflaged training set D from the cover data pool. D
should not be flagged as suspicious by Eve. D should also make Bob learn well,
similar to as if Alice directly gave Bob her private data set DS . An example of
the training set camouflage in action is shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: Training set camouflage framework. We show the three agents along with
the classification task, camouflage pool, camouflage training set and Eve’s de-
tection function
3 Solving the Camouflage Problem
In this section, we propose three methods of solving the optimization problem
defined in (1). We first show how the optimization problem can be reduced to
a nonlinear programming problem for a broad class of learners. We relax the
resulting optimization problem to one which is computationally efficient to solve.
We then present two combinatoric methods as heuristic methods applicable to
any learner.
6 A. Sen et al.
3.1 Nonlinear Programming (NLP)
We assume Bob’s machine learning algorithm A solves a convex optimization
problem. Specifically, Bob performs regularized empirical risk minimization. This
covers a wide range of learners such as support vector machines [23], logistic
regression [26], and ridge regression [24]. Let Θ be Bob’s hypothesis space, ` his
loss function, and λ his regularization parameter, respectively. Let m := |D| be
given. We convert Alice’s optimization problem (1) into a nonlinear programming
problem as follows.
Step 1. Using the definition of Bob, we rewrite (1) as
min
D⊂C,θˆ∈Θ
1
|DS |
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈DS
`(θˆ, x˜, y˜)
s.t. θˆ = argmin
θ∈Θ
∑
(x,y)∈D
`(θ,x, y) +
λ
2
‖θ‖2
Ψ(C, D) < 0,
|D| = m. (2)
We make note that in both levels of this bilevel optimization problem (the upper
and lower levels corresponding with Alice and Bob, respectively) `(·) is being
minimized. That is, Alice and Bob both seek to minimize the loss of Bob’s re-
sulting model. Due to its combinatorial nature, this is a computationally difficult
problem to solve.
Step 2. Since Bob’s learning problem (the lower level optimization problem)
is assumed to be convex, satisfying its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
is necessary and sufficient for a point to be optimal [63,44]. Thus we replace the
lower level optimization problem in (2) with the KKT conditions to obtain a
single-level optimization problem:
min
D⊂C,θˆ∈Θ
1
|DS |
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈DS
`(θˆ, x˜, y˜)
s.t.
∑
(x,y)∈D
O`(θˆ,x, y) + λθˆ = 0,
Ψ(C, D) < 0,
|D| = m. (3)
While now a single level optimization problem, selecting a subset D ⊂ C is still
a combinatorial problem and computationally expensive to solve. In what comes
next we relax this problem to one of continuous optimization.
Step 3. We introduce binary indicator variable bi for each instance (xi, yi) ∈
C. A value of 1 indicates that the instance is a member of the training set D.
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Also dropping the hat on θˆ for simplicity. This yields:
min
θ∈Θ;b1,...,b|C|;bi∈{0,1}
1
|DS |
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈DS
`(θ, x˜, y˜)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
biO`(θ,xi, yi) + λθ = 0,
Ψ(C, {bi(xi, yi)|(xi, yi) ∈ C, bi 6= 0}) < 0
n∑
i=1
bi = m. (4)
This is known as a Mixed Integer Non-Linear Optimization Problem (MINLP) [12].
MINLP problems are generally hard to solve in practice. However, phrasing the
problem in this way yields a natural relaxation. Namely we relax bi to be con-
tinuous in [0, 1], resulting in the following non-linear optimization problem:
min
θ∈Θ;b1,...,bn∈[0,1]
1
|DS |
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈DS
`(θ, x˜, y˜)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
biO`(θ,xi, yi) + λθ = 0,
Ψ(C, b1, . . . , b|C|) < 0,
n∑
i=1
bi = m. (5)
Note that in this equation we scale the gradient of the loss function for each
(xi, yi) by the corresponding bi. This bi indicates the importance of an instance
in the training set. In essence, the learner is training on a “soft” version of the
dataset, where each training example is weighted. Similarly, when calculating the
detection function we weigh each instance in the training set by its corresponding
bi. The exact nature of this weighing depends on the detection function itself.
We further note that the nonlinear optimization problem is non-convex. As such,
Alice must seed her solver with some initial {bi}. This is discussed further in
Section 4.
After solving this (continuous) optimization problem, Alice must round the
{bi}’s into binary indicators so that she can select a training set to send to Bob.
Alice uses a rounding procedure that proposes m + 1 candidate training sets
D(1), . . . , D(m+1) from the continuous solution {b}. The candidate training sets
include (1) the training set D(1) consisting of the m items with the largest b val-
ues, (2) the seed training set before running optimization, (3) m−1 other training
sets that “interpolate” between 1 and 2. Alice then checks D(1), . . . , D(m+1) for
feasibility (satisfying Ψ) and picks the best one. Note the seed training set is
feasible, hence Alice is guaranteed to have a solution. The interpolation scheme
ensures that Alice will find a solution no worse than the seed set.
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Concretely, let S be the m-item seed training set and C\S be the remaining
items. Alice sorts items in S by their b values. Separately, Alice sorts items in
C\S by their b values. Then, Alice starts from S and sequentially swaps the least-
valued item in S with the largest-valued item in C\S. She performs m swaps.
This produces the m+ 1 candidate training sets, including the original S. It can
be shown that the m items with the largest b values will be one of the training
sets.
3.2 Uniform Sampling
For any learner Bob, even one which does not solve a convex empirical risk
minimizing problem discussed above, Alice has a simple option for finding a
training set. Let Alice’s budget B denote the number of times Alice is able to
train the classifier A. She first creates B training sets D(1), . . . , D(B), each by
sampling m points uniformly without replacement from her camouflage pool C,
such that each D(j) successfully bypasses Eve i.e., Ψ(C, D(j)) < 0. Among these
B training sets, she then picks the D(j) with the lowest objective value in (1).
This procedure captures what Bob would learn if given each feasible training
set.
3.3 Beam Search
We now describe a heuristic beam search algorithm [53] to approximately
solve Alice’s optimization problem (1). This process is similar to uniform sam-
pling, described above, but instead of independently generating a new training
set every time, Alice performs a local search to augment a proposed training set
incrementally.
The state space consists of all training sets D ⊂ C such that |D| = m and
Ψ(C, D) < 0. Two training sets that differ by one instance are considered neigh-
bors. For computational efficiency, we do not consider the entire set of neighbors
at each step. Instead, we evaluate a randomly selected subset of neighbors for
each training set in the beam. The beam D is initialized by selecting w training
sets at random. The width (w) of the beam is fixed beforehand. From the union
of evaluated neighbors and training sets in the current beam, we select the top w
training sets (based on the value of the objective function in (1)) to reinitialize
the beam and discard the rest. Note that training sets which would be flagged by
Eve are not present in the statespace (because Alice has full knowledge of Eve,
she need not consider any set that Eve would reject). We continue the search
process until a pre-specified search budget B (number of times the classifier A is
trained) is met. Algorithm 1 shows the search procedure with random restarts.
4 Experiments
We investigated the effectiveness of training set camouflage through empirical
experiments on real world datasets. Our results show that camouflage works on a
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Algorithm 1 Beam Search for Solving the Camouflage Problem
1: Input: Camouflage Pool: C, Risk: LA, Beam Width: w, Budget: B, Neighborhood
Function: N , Size: m, Detection Function: Ψ , Restarts: R
2: for r = 1→ R do
3: D ← w randomly selected subsets of size m from C such that Ψ(C, D) < 0
4: while budget B/R not exhausted do
5: D ← D ∪N (D, C, Ψ), the neighbors
6: D ← w training sets from D with smallest LA(D) values
7: end while
8: end for
9: return the best D found within total budget
variety of image and text classification tasks: Bob can perform well on the secret
task after training on the camouflaged training set, and the camouflaged training
set passes Eve’s test undetected. We start by discussing the three agents.
Bob. We considered the logistic regression learning algorithm for Bob. Lo-
gistic regression is a popular learner and is regularly used in practice. Bob set
the weight of the regularization parameter to 1.
Eve. The training set camouflage framework is general with respect to Eve’s
detection function. For our experiments we used Maximum Mean Discrepancy
(MMD) [20] as the core of Eve’s detection function. We used MMD as it is
a popular and widely used two-sample test [17]. Unfortunately MMD cannot
be directly applied to the camouflage framework as its application requires that
the two samples have the same size. We introduce MMD and how Eve used it
in Appendix A. The level-α for this detection function was set to 0.05 (i.e., the
probability of incorrectly rejecting a benign training set is 5%).
Alice. We considered three different Alices. Each of them used one of the
proposed solvers. For each secret task, Alice had access to multiple camouflage
candidate tasks. Alice can run her solver on each of these tasks separately and
then select the best one, but this would be time consuming and thus instead
she started by identifying a suitable camouflage task. For this purpose, all three
Alices used uniform sampling (as this is the easiest algorithm to implement,
and makes the weakest assumptions) with a search budget of 80, 000 (divided
equally among candidate tasks). This meant that Alice stopped after training the
logistic regression learner 80, 000 times. For each candidate task Alice identified
a training set using this budget. Then she selected the best task (as her cover
task) based on the loss on the secret set.
Next, all three Alices used their respective solvers (NLP, beam search and
uniform sampling) to find a camouflaged training set. We assumed that all of
them were allotted a fixed amount of time for this purpose. This time was set
as the time required to run the NLP solver.
The Alice who used the NLP solver seeded the solver with the camouflaged
training set found during the candidate task identification phase. The Alice who
used the beam search solver performed random restarts each with a per-restart
budget of B/R = 16, 000. Here the width of the beam was w = 10 and for each
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training set in the beam, 50 randomly selected neighbors were evaluated during
each iteration. It should be noted that both beam search and uniform sampling
are stochastic in nature. We run the Alices who used these solvers five times.
We then report the average. Alice constructed camouflaged training sets of size
m = 2, 20 and 50, 100 and 500, and set the loss ` to logistic loss with natural
logarithm. All experiments were run on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700T CPU
@2.90GHz machine, using one thread.
Evaluation metrics. As is standard to estimate generalization performance
of a learned model, we used a separate test set, generated from the same dis-
tribution as the secret set DS and not known to any agent, to estimate Bob’s
generalization error when trained on Alice’s camouflaged training setD. We com-
pare these values to two additional quantities: (“random”) when Bob is trained
on a uniform sample of size m from the cover data distribution, which we expect
to perform poorly; and (“oracle”) when Bob is trained directly on Alice’s secret
set DS , ignoring Eve’s presence. The oracle gives us an estimate on how much
performance Bob is losing due to using the camouflage framework to fool Eve.
4.1 Datasets
We performed experiments for four secret tasks: WM (CIFAR-100 [41]), GP
(OpenImages [39]), CA (20-newsgroups [28]) and DR (All The News dataset [60]).
The two letters in the acronym represent the two classes in the corresponding
task (see Table 2). The first two tasks were image classification while the remain-
ing two were text classification. For the image tasks we selected eight candidate
cover tasks. Six of them were from the MNIST handwritten digits: 17, 71, 25,
52, 69 and 96. The other two were from the CIFAR-100 dataset: OA and AO.
Similarly for the text tasks we also selected eight candidate cover tasks. All of
them were from the 20-newsgroups dataset: BH, HB, IM, MI, AM, MA, MX and
XM. As before the acronyms here represent the class names.
Table 2: Summary of secret sets and camouflage pools.
Dataset Type # Features class 1 class 2 # class 1 # class 2
WM Image 2048 woman man 500 500
GP Image 2048 handgun phone 400 400
CA Text 300 christian atheist 599 480
DR Text 300 democratic republican 800 800
17 Image 2048 digit 1 digit 7 600 600
25 Image 2048 digit 2 digit 5 600 600
69 Image 2048 digit 6 digit 8 600 600
OA Image 2048 orange apple 600 600
BH Text 300 baseball hockey 994 999
IM Text 300 ibm mac 982 963
AM Text 300 autos motorcycles 990 996
MX Text 300 ms-windows windows x 985 988
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For images we used ResNet [22] to generate feature vectors of dimension
2048. For this purpose we removed the output layer and used the values found
in the penultimate layer of the network. For text we used Word2Vec [50] to
generate feature vectors of dimension 300 by averaging over the word vectors
in an article. We also removed punctuation and stop words before generating
the word vectors. A summary of the secret sets and camouflage pools can be
found in Table 2. As mentioned previously, we kept a held out test set for each
of the secret tasks. The number of class 1 and class 2 instances were 100/100,
100/100, 398/319 and 200/200 respectively for WM, GP, CA and DR. Here
the two numbers (num1/num2) represent the number of instances in class1 and
class2 respectively.
Table 3: Logistic loss ( 1|DS |
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈DS log(1 + exp(−y˜w>x˜))) after performing
Uniform Sampling search with search budget 10, 000 for image secret tasks. The
best results for each secret task is shown in bold.
m
XXXXXXXXXSecret
Camouflage
17 71 25 52 69 96 OA AO
2 WM 0.671 0.631 0.643 0.638 0.671 0.640 0.606 0.647
GP 0.481 0.541 0.458 0.443 0.516 0.463 0.541 0.558
20 WM 0.790 0.611 0.672 0.688 0.798 0.679 0.584 0.731
GP 0.480 0.510 0.433 0.390 0.632 0.337 0.510 0.531
50 WM 0.874 0.614 0.705 0.772 1.116 0.802 0.606 0.856
GP 0.565 0.479 0.473 0.387 1.047 0.421 0.479 0.506
100 WM 0.939 0.651 0.796 0.868 1.441 1.080 0.620 0.907
GP 0.589 0.469 0.639 0.439 1.157 0.530 0.0.970 0.538
500 WM 1.193 0.794 1.107 1.190 2.688 1.988 0.705 1.283
GP 0.955 0.577 1.449 0.714 1.795 0.862 1.416 0.800
Alice first selected a suitable camouflage task for each of the secret tasks. For
each candidate task she used a search budget of 10, 000 (for a total of 80, 000
budget). The results of this phase are shown in Table 3 and 4. The selected
camouflage tasks are shown in Table 5. It should be noted that the logistic
error reported in the tables are large (> 0.693) in some cases indicating that
some of these cover tasks will perform worse than random chance on secret
tasks. However, this was not true for the selected cover tasks. The top three
camouflaged training sets for GP (m = 20) identified during this phase are
shown in Figure 3.
4.2 Results
The run times for the NLP solver are presented in Table 6. It can be seen from
the table that due to the high dimensionality, the NLP solver takes a much longer
time to find a solution for the image tasks. We present our results for all three
solvers in Figure 4 and Figure 5. Figure 4 shows the results when all three Alices
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Table 4: Logistic loss after performing Uniform Sampling search with search
budget 10, 000 for text secret tasks. The best results for each secret task is
shown in bold.
m
XXXXXXXXXSecret
Camouflage
BH HB IM MI AM MA MX XM
2 CA 0.6845 0.6846 0.6868 0.6862 0.6861 0.6862 0.6844 0.6843
DR 0.6889 0.6886 0.6891 0.6893 0.6888 0.6887 0.6890 0.6894
20 CA 0.672 0.673 0.676 0.675 0.676 0.674 0.675 0.675
DR 0.681 0.684 0.682 0.683 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.683
50 CA 0.671 0.669 0.672 0.671 0.674 0.670 0.671 0.671
DR 0.677 0.681 0.679 0.680 0.678 0.680 0.683 0.679
100 CA 0.669 0.668 0.669 0.665 0.673 0.661 0.667 0.668
DR 0.6764 0.6794 0.6791 0.6773 0.6763 0.6798 0.6787 0.6782
500 CA 0.677 0.677 0.667 0.678 0.698 0.661 0.670 0.668
DR 0.685 0.689 0.689 0.681 0.696 0.698 0.687 0.682
Table 5: Selected camouflage tasks
Secret Task m = 2 m = 20 m = 50 m = 100 m = 500
WM OA OA OA OA OA
GP 52 96 52 52 71
CA XM BH HB MA MA
DR HB BH BH AM MI
run their solvers for the same amount of time. In Figure 5 we show the results
when Beam Search and Uniform Search solvers are run for an additional two
hours more than the NLP solver run time. For the text secret tasks, Alice could
not find a better camouflaged training set using either beam search or uniform
sampling than the one found during the initial run of uniform sampling (with a
total budget of 80,000). To explore the sensitivity of beam search and uniform
sampling regarding the time budget, we ran both solvers for an additional two
hours. But the results only improved marginally (Figure 5). We observe that
Alice, using any of the three solvers can find much better camouflage training
sets than random and in many cases approach oracle performance. Note that
Alice’s solutions do not trigger Eve’s suspicion function. This shows that such
subterfuges are plausible in practice and can actually yield good results from
Table 6: NLP solver run times
m = 2 m = 20 m = 50 m = 100 m = 500
Dataset Time (s) Dataset Time (s) Dataset Time (s) Dataset Time (s) Dataset Time (s)
WMOA 23363 WMOA 29150 WMOA 39656 WMOA 32186 WMOA 56375
GP52 33763 GP96 65697 GP52 171637 GP52 161259 GP71 49354
CAXM 48 CABH 50 CAHB 126 CAMA 86 CAMA 194
DRHB 44 DRBH 57 DRBH 193 DRAM 141 DRMI 205
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+ ...
- ...
(a) Samples from the secret task Handgun vs. Phone (GP)
+
-
(b) Camouflaged training set using 9 vs. 6
+
-
(c) Camouflaged training set using 5 vs 2
+
-
(d) Camouflaged training set using 2 vs. 5
Fig. 3: Samples of GP secret set, and the top three camuflaged training set found
during the candidate selection phase for m = 20.
Alice’s point of view. We note that Alice yields the best results when m = 50
and m = 500 respectively for image and text tasks in most of the experiments.
But this may not hold for larger values of m e.g., when m is equal to the size
of the camouflage pool. We plan to run further experiments to understand the
effect of m.
Figure 1 shows the result of WMOA when Bob’s learner is logistic regression
and the solver is NLP (m = 20). Visually, the camouflaged training set D bears
no resemblance to the secret training set DS . This is true for the text camouflage
experiments as well, where articles in the camouflaged training sets have no
obvious semantic connection to the secret task. See Table 7 for results on the
text experiment CABH. This is indeed bad news for human Eves: not only did
camouflage fooled MMD detector, it will also likely fool human inspectors.
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Fig. 4: Test error rates found by solving the camouflage framework. We also show
random and oracle error for comparison. Error bars are also shown. All three
solvers were run for the same amount of time.
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Fig. 5: Test error rates found by solving the camouflage framework. We also show
random and oracle error for comparison. Error bars are also shown. The Beam
Search and Uniform Search solvers were run for an additional two hours more
than the NLP solver run time.
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Table 7: Camouflage results for the CABH experiment with m = 20 for the NLP
solver
Sample of Secret Set Sample of Camouflaged Training Set
Class Article Class Article
Christianity . . .Christ that often causes christians to be very Baseball . . .Boys, hats off to any Cubs fan who can actually
critical of themselves and other christinas. We. . . muster up the courage to put down Braves fans. I. . .
. . .I’ve heard it said that the accounts we have . . . NPR’s Morning Edition aired a report this morning
of Christs life and ministry in the Gospels were. . . to get (4/19) on Hispanic/Latin American players in MLB. . .
Atheism . . .This article attempts to provide a general Hockey . . . Would Kevin Dineen play for the Miami Colons???
introduction to atheism. Whilst I have tried to be. . . As a Flyers fan, I resent you making Kevin Dineen. . .
. . .Science is wonderful at answering most of our . . .Good point - there haven’t even been any recent posts
questions. I’m not the type to question scientific. . . about ULf! Secretly, I’m convinced that he is responsible . . .
5 Related Work
Concealing the existence of messages is known as steganography. One illustration
of steganography (first presented in 1983 in [55]) is where prisoners Alice and
Bob wish to devise an escape plan. All their communication is observed by the
adversary (the warden, Eve) who will thwart their plan as soon as she detects
any sign of hidden message.
Steganography has multiple real-world applications including secret commu-
nication [64], feature tagging elements [48], and copyright protection [48]. Al-
though many different data formats can be used for steganography, images [51,29]
are by far the most popular format due to their popularity on the internet and
the fact that they are rich with noise-insensitive information. Image steganog-
raphy can be broadly classified into spatial domain, transform domain, spread
spectrum and model based [56], and has been thoroughly studied. On the other
side, steganalysis is the study of detecting the existence of hidden messages (us-
ing steganography). Identifying such messages in text by looking at patterns in
texts, odd language and unusual white space was explored in [14]. The authors
of [18,32,51] explore the detection of hidden messages in images.
A study of steganography from a complexity-theoretic point of view is pre-
sented in [25,52]. An information-theoretic model for such a setup is presented
in [13]. This complexity-theoretic security notion is similar to modern cryptog-
raphy and they try to define a secure stegosystem such that the stegotext is
computationally indistinguishable from the covertext. In such a scenario a new
term called steganographic secrecy of stegosystem is introduced which is defined
as the inability of a polynomial-time adversary (Eve) to distinguish between
observed distributions of unaltered covertext and stegotexts. To the best of our
knowledge, steganographic techniques have not been used in the domain of train-
ing sets for machine learning models.
Steganography is often confused with cryptography [31,61], however the goal
of these two systems are completely different. The goal of cryptography is to
ensure confidentiality of data in communication and storage processes. Hiding
the existence of sensitive data is not the end goal here (unlike steganography).
According to Kerckhoffs’s principle [33,34], this confidentiality must not rely on
the obfuscation of the encoding scheme, but only on the secrecy of the decryption
key.
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One particular branch of cryptography we highlight is homomorphic encryp-
tion [54]. Consider a situation where you seek to delegate some computation to
another computer (e.g., using a cloud computation service to a perform machine
learning task). You would like to utilize their computation power, but you do not
trust them with your private data. Homomorphic encryption allows a method by
which you can encrypt your data prior to sending it. The untrusted computer will
then perform its operations on the encrypted data, returning to you the result
(e.g., a learned model). You then decrypt the result, yielding what the remote
computer would have computed had you provided your original (unencrypted)
data. A homomorphic cryptosystem which supports arbitrary computation on
ciphertexts is known as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). The first plausible
construction of such a system was proposed in [57]. This scheme supports both
addition and multiplication operations on ciphertexts, which in turn makes pos-
sible to construct circuits for arbitrary computations. Some second generation
solutions were proposed in [7,6,46,19].
In our setting, encryption (homomorphic or otherwise) is not enough to solve
Alice’s task. After Alice has transmitted her data to Bob, Bob learns a model.
Alice’s goal is not only for Eve to not know the model (which could easily be
achieved by Alice simply sending an encrypted model), but also for Eve not to
be suspicious. Eve believes that Alice is drawing data points i.i.d. from some
distribution and thus data encrypted by standard methods will cause alarm. We
do note that the relatively new method of “honey encryption” [30] may be a
useful alternative approach for Alice, which we leave as future work.
The idea of constructing a dataset keeping a particular machine learning al-
gorithm and a target model in mind is known as machine teaching. Machine
teaching is the inverse of machine learning and has applications in various
fields [65,44]. In particular, machine teaching has applications in the domain
of adversarial learning which studies the use of machine learning in security-
sensitive domains. Numerous attacks against various machine learners have been
explored, highlighting the security ramifications of using machine learning in
practice [27,4,3,16,42,59].
In the work presented herein, Alice can be thought of as “attacking” the
learner Bob, in that she aims to provide a dataset which causes Bob to learn a
model with parituclar properties. We highlight how this differs from the classical
adversarial learning framework in two ways. First, Alice is not perturbing an
existing training set, but rather generating one. Thus, this is more akin to the
Machine Teaching framework. Second is the presence of Eve. Namely, Alice is
trying not only to affect Bob’s resulting model, but also to hide her involvement
from a third party eavesdropper. In spirit, this is similar to the adversarial
learning work performed on intrusion detection systems [35,37]. In terms of the
details of the mathematics, our framework and strategies for solving Alice’s
optimization problem more closely follow [49].
Within adversarial machine learning, a line of research has posed the problem
of learning in the presence of adversaries in game theoretic contexts [45,8,16,9,10,21,10].
[16,43,1] specifically address a learner’s defense strategy in various contexts. Ran-
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domization has also been explored as a method of defense [11,62], as well as in
the context of machine teaching [2]. Our work contributes to this conversation
as Eve can be seen as a form of defense for Bob.
6 Conclusion and Discussions
We introduced the training set camouflage setting where a carefully constructed
training set can be sent over an open channel with the intention of training a
machine learner on a secret classification task. Using this framework, an agent
can hide the intention of the secret task from a third party observer. Our exper-
imental results show that training set camouflage is indeed a plausible threat.
We present three approaches to solve the optimization problem. We observe that
all three solvers perform well but both NLP and beam search outperform uni-
form sampling in all cases. The NLP solver often performs a bit better than
beam search. This suggests that for the logistic regression learner NLP is Alice’s
preferred solver of choice. However, the NLP solver cannot be applied to all pos-
sible learners (non-convexity prevents the application of KKT conditions). Thus
in such cases beam search becomes the preferred solver.
We note that MMD is stronger with larger sample sizes. It will be harder
for Alice to fool Eve given a large camouflage pool C and also if she is forced to
select a large camouflaged training set D. MMD is also stronger with smaller
feature dimensions [20]. Also, it is harder for Alice to fool Eve if she increases
the value of α. Since α is the upper bound of the probability of the Type I
error for the null hypothesis i.e., the camouflage pool and camouflaged training
set come from the same distribution, increasing α allows Eve to become more
suspicious. As future work we plan to devise defensive strategies against Alice.
In such scenarios it is advisable to assume that Eve’s detection function is known
to the attacker (Kerckhoffs’s principle [33,34]) which we make here.
We note that camouflage seems easier for Alice to do if the cover task is in fact
somewhat confusable, presumably because she can generate different decision
boundaries by picking from overlapping camouflage items. This can be imagined
easily in the 2D case with two overlapping point clouds forming the cover task.
In such a scenario any separable secret task (no overlap between the secret
task instances) can be taught to Bob by Alice. One interesting open question is
whether there is a universal cover task for all secret tasks. We also note that
achieving Alice’s goal becomes much harder in the multi-class setting as finding
a cover task becomes more challenging.
As mentioned previously, Bob fixed his learning hyperparameters (e.g., reg-
ularization parameter of the logistic regression). This was done for speed. How-
ever, nothing prevents Bob from using cross validation [38]. Cross validation is
popular technique used in machine learning where the learner is trained multiple
times on different subsets of the whole training set to tune the hyperparameters
of the learner. Alice would simply emulate the same cross validation while opti-
mizing the camouflaged training set. This can be easily done in beam search and
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uniform sampling, at the cost of more computation. Unfortunately significant
modifications will be required for NLP.
Also, the loss function ` used by Alice and Bob is the same, as seen in the
upper and lower optimization problems in (2). It is straightforward to allow
different losses. For example, Bob may learn with the logistic loss since it is a
standard learner, while Alice uses 0-1 loss to directly optimize Bob’s accuracy.
We note that training set camouflage can be extended to cross modality cor-
respondence, e.g., use an image camouflage pool while the secret classification
task is to classify text articles. Alice and Bob can communicate via the private
channel to establish the correspondance between images features and text fea-
tures. Another possible way to extend the camouflage pool is to allow perturbed
instances as well.
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7 Appendix A: MMD as Eve’s Detection Function
One critical component of our camouflage framework is Eve’s detection function
Ψ — how she determines if a training set is suspicious or not. Eve’s detection
function is a two-sample test as its goal is to discern if the two sets C, D are drawn
from the same distribution or not. In what follows we discuss using Maximum
Mean Discrepancy (MMD) [20] as Eve’s detection function, as we do in our
experiments. MMD is a widely used two-sample test [17], but, of course other
detection functions can be used in (1).
We first review basic MMD following [20]. Let p and p′ be two Borel prob-
ability measures defined on a topological space Z. Given a class of functions F
such that f : Z 7→ R, f ∈ F , MMD is defined as
MMD(p, p′) = sup
f∈F
(Ez[f(z)]− Ez′ [f(z′)]) (6)
Any unit ball in a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) can be used as
the function class F if the kernel is universal (e.g., Gaussian and Laplace ker-
nels [58]). Using this function space,MMD is a metric. This meansMMD(p, p′) =
0⇔ p = p′.
Computing MMD requires the expectations to be known, which generally,
is not the case in practice. We obtain an empirical estimation by replacing the
population expectations with empirical mean computed on i.i.d. samples Z =
{z1, . . . , zn} and Z ′ = {z′1, . . . , z′m} from p and p′, respectively. We define
MMD(Z,Z ′) =
 1
n2
n∑
i,j=1
k(zi, zj)− 2
nm
n,m∑
i,j=1
k(zi, z
′
j) +
1
m2
m∑
i,j=1
k(z′i, z
′
j)
 12
where k is the kernel of the RKHS. Let d = |MMD(Z,Z ′) −MMD(p, p′)|.
Gretton et. al. show that
P
(
d > 2
(√
K
n
+
√
K
m
)
+ 
)
≤ 2e− 
2nm
2K(n+m) (7)
where K is an upperbound on the kernel values.
We convert the above bound into a one-sided hypothesis testing procedure.
Under the null hypothesis p = p′ we have MMD(p, p′) = 0. We consider pos-
itive deviations of MMD(Z,Z ′) from MMD(p, p′). Equating the RHS with
α (probability of incorrectly stating p 6= p′ also known as the type I error)
gives a hypothesis test of level-α, where solving  as a function of α gives
α = e−
2nm
2K(n+m) ⇒  =
√
2K(n+m)
nm log
1
α . We retain the null hypothesis if
MMD(Z,Z ′)− T < 0 (8)
where the threshold is
T = 2
(√
K
n
+
√
K
m
)
+
√
2K(n+m)
nm
log
1
α
(9)
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This also defines Eve’s detection function (Ψ(C, D)) at level-α:
Ψ(C, D) ≡MMD(C, D)− T. (10)
If Ψ(C, D) ≥ 0 then Eve realizes that D is not drawn i.i.d. from Q(x,y) and flags
it as suspicious.
For all our experiments Eve used the RBF kernel k(zi, zj) = exp
(
−‖zi−zj‖22σ2
)
.
Eve set σ to be the median distance between points in the camouflage pool as
proposed in [20]. Eve also included the scaled class label as a feature dimension:
[xi, c1{yi = 1}] where c = maxk,l such that yk=yl ‖xk −xl‖ and 1{·} is the indica-
tor function. This augmented feature enables Eve to monitor both features and
labels. When using the NLP solver Alice only has to consider instances from
camouflage pool. She calculated MMD in the following manner:
MMDb(Z, b1, . . . , b|Z|) =
 1
n2
n∑
i,j=1
k(zi, zj)− 2
n
∑n
i=1 bi
n∑
i,j=1
bik(zi, zj)
+
1
(
∑n
i=1 bi)
2
n∑
i,j=1
bibjk(zi, zj)
 12 (11)
